Abstract: Key-exchange protocols have been overlooked as a possible means for implementing oblivious transfer (OT). In this paper we present a protocol for mutual exchange of secrets, 1-out-of-2 OT and coin-flipping similar to DiffieHellman protocol using the idea of obliviously exchanging encryption keys. Since, Diffie-Hellman scheme is widely used, our protocol may provide a useful alternative to the conventional methods for implementation of oblivious transfer and a useful primitive in building larger cryptographic schemes.
Introduction
Oblivious transfer (OT), discussed by Stephen Wiesner as conjugate coding [1] became popular when Rabin described a scheme for mutual exchange of secrets [2] . This combined with 1-outof-2 oblivious transfer led to the development of numerous cryptographic tools.
An oblivious transfer protocol is a scheme in which Alice transfers to Bob a secret without knowing if Bob received it, while Bob may or may not receive the secret, each happening with a certain probability, usually one-half. Such a scheme using Elliptic Curve Cryptography has been discussed in [3] .
In this paper we construct a protocol for oblivious transfer using key exchange similar to DiffieHellman (DH) protocol [4] , which is a popular method for establishing a shared key between two parties over an insecure channel. We modify the Diffie-Hellman protocol such that the two communicating parties will succeed or fail in establishing a shared key each with a probability of one-half. However, the party sending the secret will not know if the receiver has the same key as he/she does.
There have been implementations [5, 6 ] of 1-out-of-n OT based on the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem [7] . However, our protocol differs from previous ones in the sense that -firstly, we describe a scheme for mutual exchange of secrets based on DH. Secondly, in the previous implementations the 1-out-of-n OT use the DDH for the transfer itself, i.e. applies the DiffieHellman exponentiation for the encryption of secrets directly. Here we administer the idea of the oblivious key exchange. Once the keys are exchanged (obliviously), the parties may use any mutually agreed encryption method for the actual transfer / exchange of secrets.
The security of our protocol arises from the fact that the problem of determining an exponent e given x , y and a prime p , such that y p x e = mod is equivalent to solving a Discrete Log Problem (DLP) efficiently.
The participants choose numbers p and x , such that p is a large prime on the order of at least 300 decimal digits (1024 bits), 1 − p has a large prime factor and x is a generator of order 1 − p in the multiplicative group p Ζ (a generator is a primitive root of p ). This ensures the security of the protocols not only against eavesdroppers but also against the opposing party, which is to be considered as an adversary as well. Since we will be working only in p Ζ , we often do not state it explicitly.
The proof that the security of Rabin's cryptosystem is equivalent to a factorization problem led to the development of the zero-knowledge proof [8] . In such a proof a prover tries to convince a verifier that he possesses certain information but he does not disclose the information but only the proof that he possesses the information. With every iteration of the algorithm, the probability of an imposter cheating a verifier decreases exponentially. We will discuss a scheme for zeroknowledge proof based on the discrete log problem.
Mutual exchange of secrets
Suppose Alice and Bob possess secrets A S and B S respectively, which they wish to exchange, however, they do not trust each other. We would like to complete the exchange without a trusted third party and without a procedure for simultaneous exchange of secrets; the latter being practically impossible to implement when the parties are geographically far apart. Both parties are assumed to have an appropriate mechanism to digitally sign every message they send.
Let the secrets A S and B S be passwords to files that Bob and Alice want to access such that if a wrong password is used then the files will self-destruct. This prevents the parties from trying random passwords. The protocol is based on the oblivious exchange of encryption keys. and a random number B N . 
Alice sends to Bob:
is a function known to both Alice and Bob, where m is the input, k is the key and knowing c does not reveal the key used. f may be an encryption function using a secret key
f is the decryption function.
Compare with M to determine if
Illustration of proposed algorithm to achieve oblivious exchange of encryption key (all computations performed in p Ζ ). Two cases arise from the above sequence, namely Discrete Log Problem is difficult to solve, the protocol remains secure.
One-out-of-two oblivious transfer
One of the most powerful primitives that have led to the invention of numerous cryptographic schemes is the one-out-of-two oblivious transfer. It may conceptually be described as a black box where Alice puts in two secrets, 1 S and 2 S , such that Bob can only retrieve one of them while getting no information about the other. Bob is concerned that Alice should not know which secret he retrieved.
A situation may be such that a spy wishes to sell one out of two secrets that he possesses, while the buyer does not wish the spy to know which information he wants. In such a situation the 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer can be employed. It is assumed that the party possessing the two secrets is willing to disclose one and only one of these to the other. 7. Alice encrypts secret 1 S using 1 K and secret 2 S using 2 K and sends them to Bob.
From the above sequence we see that if Bob chooses
and if Bob chooses
Hence, Bob will only be able to retrieve one of the two secrets depending upon his choice, while Alice will not be able to determine which secret Bob has retrieved.
Security issues:
In order for Bob to cheat, he needs to compute both 1 K and 2 K . His best option is to determine one of the keys honestly and using that, try to deduce the other key. 
Coin-Flipping Protocols
A couple may decide on which restaurant to go to or whether they should take a vacation or buy a car for their next anniversary, by tossing a coin. In this case flipping a coin is a trivial matter since both parties are present at the same place physically. However, problems arise when the participants are geographically separated over large distances. How are they supposed to fairly flip a coin when both of them cannot see the outcome simultaneously? Many business transactions require such an arrangement or a simple game of gambling over the Web may need a fair coin-toss. Numerous solutions exist for this purpose that employ cryptographic techniques of bit commitment [9, 10] .
A zero-knowledge proof can be used for identification if the verifier knows the value of e , which acts like a password. The prover has to convince the verifier that he knows the password, without actually giving it out. This is because the verifier may be an imposter trying to determine the password by cheating.
Conclusion
Our algorithm opens up the possibility of development of oblivious transfer schemes using key exchange protocols. Academically, it appears that such algorithms should have preceded Rabin's protocol. It shows that there exist numerous variations on the implementation of OT protocols. Also, most OT schemes can be extended to coin flipping with minor modifications, in which case, only one sided transfer may take place and success or failure depends on the opposing party being lucky enough to deduce the key.
Our protocol is different from Rabin's protocol in the sense that the latter aims at obliviously transmitting the decryption key from the transmitter to the receiver whereas we establish a shared key between the transmitter and receiver with probability one-half. Higher exponents may be employed to generate transfer probabilities other than one-half. It turns out that the DiffieHellman protocol is a powerful primitive and can be used as a basis for implementing many cryptographic protocols that have been implemented via the RSA type transformations. This possibility had been overlooked.
